Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise.
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Improve work quality by 30-40% with less effort
Time estimate: 15-45 minutes depending on use case complexity
Prerequisites
Submit your Claude Code skill and start earning
epx add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifactsCompatible with
Supported agents
| name | analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts |
| description | Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | malware-analysis |
| tags | - supply-chain - malware-analysis - trojanized-software - solarwinds - 3cx - dependency-confusion - software-integrity |
| version | '1.0' |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| atlas_techniques | - AML.T0010 - AML.T0104 |
| nist_ai_rmf | - GOVERN-5.2 - MAP-1.6 - MANAGE-2.2 |
| d3fend_techniques | - Platform Hardening - Hardware Component Inventory - Restore Object - Electromagnetic Radiation Hardening - RF Shielding |
| nist_csf | - DE.AE-02 - RS.AN-03 - ID.RA-01 - DE.CM-01 |
Supply chain attacks compromise legitimate software distribution channels to deliver malware through trusted update mechanisms. Notable examples include SolarWinds SUNBURST (2020, affecting 18,000+ customers), 3CX SmoothOperator (2023, a cascading supply chain attack originating from Trading Technologies), and numerous npm/PyPI package poisoning campaigns. Analysis involves comparing trojanized binaries against legitimate versions, identifying injected code in build artifacts, examining code signing anomalies, and tracing the infection chain from initial compromise through payload delivery. As of 2025, supply chain attacks account for 30% of all breaches, a 100% increase from prior years.
pefile, ssdeep, hashlib#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Compare trojanized binary against legitimate version."""
import hashlib
import pefile
import sys
import json
def compare_pe_files(legitimate_path, suspect_path):
"""Compare PE file structures between legitimate and suspect versions."""
legit_pe = pefile.PE(legitimate_path)
suspect_pe = pefile.PE(suspect_path)
report = {"differences": [], "suspicious_sections": [], "import_changes": []}
# Compare sections
legit_sections = {s.Name.rstrip(b'\x00').decode(): {
"size": s.SizeOfRawData,
"entropy": s.get_entropy(),
"characteristics": s.Characteristics,
} for s in legit_pe.sections}
suspect_sections = {s.Name.rstrip(b'\x00').decode(): {
"size": s.SizeOfRawData,
"entropy": s.get_entropy(),
"characteristics": s.Characteristics,
} for s in suspect_pe.sections}
# Find new or modified sections
for name, props in suspect_sections.items():
if name not in legit_sections:
report["suspicious_sections"].append({
"name": name, "reason": "New section not in legitimate version",
"size": props["size"], "entropy": round(props["entropy"], 2),
})
elif abs(props["size"] - legit_sections[name]["size"]) > 1024:
report["suspicious_sections"].append({
"name": name, "reason": "Section size significantly changed",
"legit_size": legit_sections[name]["size"],
"suspect_size": props["size"],
})
# Compare imports
legit_imports = set()
if hasattr(legit_pe, 'DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT'):
for entry in legit_pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:
for imp in entry.imports:
if imp.name:
legit_imports.add(f"{entry.dll.decode()}!{imp.name.decode()}")
suspect_imports = set()
if hasattr(suspect_pe, 'DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT'):
for entry in suspect_pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:
for imp in entry.imports:
if imp.name:
suspect_imports.add(f"{entry.dll.decode()}!{imp.name.decode()}")
new_imports = suspect_imports - legit_imports
if new_imports:
report["import_changes"] = list(new_imports)
# Check code signing
report["legit_signed"] = bool(legit_pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[4].Size)
report["suspect_signed"] = bool(suspect_pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[4].Size)
return report
def hash_file(filepath):
"""Calculate multiple hashes for a file."""
hashes = {}
with open(filepath, 'rb') as f:
data = f.read()
for algo in ['md5', 'sha1', 'sha256']:
h = hashlib.new(algo)
h.update(data)
hashes[algo] = h.hexdigest()
return hashes
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <legitimate_binary> <suspect_binary>")
sys.exit(1)
report = compare_pe_files(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2])
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
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Before installing skills in Cursor, ensure your development environment meets these requirements:
node --versionanalyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifactsExecute the skills CLI command in your project's root directory to begin installation:
epx add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifactsFetches analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills and configures it for Cursor.
The CLI shows a list of agents. Use arrow keys and space to select Cursor:
Confirm successful installation by checking the skill directory location:
.cursor/skills/analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts
Restart Cursor to activate analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts. Access via /analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifactsin your agent's command palette.
Learn more:View source on GitHubSkills CLI docsAbout CursorWhat are agent skills?
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Solid pick for teams standardizing on skills: analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts is focused, and the summary matches what you get after install.
We added analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts from the explainx registry; install was straightforward and the SKILL.md answered most questions upfront.
Registry listing for analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts matched our evaluation — installs cleanly and behaves as described in the markdown.
analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts reduced setup friction for our internal harness; good balance of opinion and flexibility.
Solid pick for teams standardizing on skills: analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts is focused, and the summary matches what you get after install.
analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts reduced setup friction for our internal harness; good balance of opinion and flexibility.
analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts fits our agent workflows well — practical, well scoped, and easy to wire into existing repos.
We added analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts from the explainx registry; install was straightforward and the SKILL.md answered most questions upfront.
We added analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts from the explainx registry; install was straightforward and the SKILL.md answered most questions upfront.
analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts fits our agent workflows well — practical, well scoped, and easy to wire into existing repos.
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