swift-security-expert▌
ivan-magda/swift-security-skill · updated Apr 22, 2026
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Philosophy: Non-opinionated, correctness-focused. This skill provides facts, verified patterns, and Apple-documented best practices — not architecture mandates. It covers iOS 13+ as a minimum deployment target, with modern recommendations targeting iOS 17+ and forward-looking guidance through iOS 26 (post-quantum). Every code pattern is grounded in Apple documentation, DTS engineer posts (Quinn "The Eskimo!"), WWDC sessions, and OWASP MASTG — never from memory alone.
Keychain & Security Expert Skill
Philosophy: Non-opinionated, correctness-focused. This skill provides facts, verified patterns, and Apple-documented best practices — not architecture mandates. It covers iOS 13+ as a minimum deployment target, with modern recommendations targeting iOS 17+ and forward-looking guidance through iOS 26 (post-quantum). Every code pattern is grounded in Apple documentation, DTS engineer posts (Quinn "The Eskimo!"), WWDC sessions, and OWASP MASTG — never from memory alone.
What this skill is: A reference for reviewing, improving, and implementing keychain operations, biometric authentication, CryptoKit cryptography, credential lifecycle management, certificate trust, and compliance mapping on Apple platforms.
What this skill is not: A networking guide, a server-side security reference, or an App Transport Security manual. TLS configuration, server certificate management, and backend auth architecture are out of scope except where they directly touch client-side keychain or trust APIs.
Decision Tree
Determine the user's intent, then follow the matching branch. If ambiguous, ask.
┌─────────────────────┐
│ What is the task? │
└─────────┬───────────┘
┌──────────────────┼──────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌────────────┐
│ REVIEW │ │ IMPROVE │ │ IMPLEMENT │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Audit │ │ Migrate / │ │ Build from │
│ existing│ │ modernize │ │ scratch │
│ code │ │ existing │ │ │
└────┬────┘ └─────┬─────┘ └─────┬──────┘
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
Run Top-Level Identify gap Identify which
Review Checklist (legacy store? domain(s) apply,
(§ below) against wrong API? load reference
the code. missing auth?) file(s), follow
Flag each item Load migration + ✅ patterns.
as ✅ / ❌ / domain-specific Implement with
⚠️ N/A. reference files. add-or-update,
For each ❌, Follow ✅ patterns, proper error
cite the verify with domain handling, and
reference file checklist. correct access
and specific control from
section. the start.
Branch 1 — REVIEW (Audit Existing Code)
Goal: Systematically evaluate existing keychain/security code for correctness, security, and compliance.
Procedure:
- Run the Top-Level Review Checklist (below) against the code under review. Score each item ✅ / ❌ / ⚠️ N/A.
- For each ❌ failure, load the cited reference file and locate the specific anti-pattern or correct pattern.
- Cross-check anti-patterns — scan code against all 10 entries in
common-anti-patterns.md. Pay special attention to:UserDefaultsfor secrets (#1), hardcoded keys (#2),LAContext.evaluatePolicy()as sole auth gate (#3), ignoredOSStatus(#4). - Check compliance — if the project requires OWASP MASVS or enterprise audit readiness, map findings to
compliance-owasp-mapping.mdcategories M1, M3, M9, M10. - Report format: For each finding, state: what's wrong → which reference file covers it → the ✅ correct pattern → severity (CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM).
Key reference files for review:
- Start with:
common-anti-patterns.md(backbone — covers 10 most dangerous patterns) - Then domain-specific files based on what the code does
- Finish with:
compliance-owasp-mapping.md(if compliance is relevant)
Branch 2 — IMPROVE (Migrate / Modernize)
Goal: Upgrade existing code from insecure storage, deprecated APIs, or legacy patterns to current best practices.
Procedure:
-
Identify the migration type:
- Insecure storage → Keychain: Load
migration-legacy-stores.md+credential-storage-patterns.md - Legacy Security framework → CryptoKit: Load
cryptokit-symmetric.mdorcryptokit-public-key.md+migration-legacy-stores.md - RSA → Elliptic Curve: Load
cryptokit-public-key.md(RSA migration section) - GenericPassword → InternetPassword (AutoFill): Load
keychain-item-classes.md(migration section) - LAContext-only → Keychain-bound biometrics: Load
biometric-authentication.md - File-based keychain → Data protection keychain (macOS): Load
keychain-fundamentals.md(TN3137 section) - Single app → Shared keychain (extensions): Load
keychain-sharing.md - Leaf pinning → SPKI/CA pinning: Load
certificate-trust.md
- Insecure storage → Keychain: Load
-
Follow the migration pattern in the relevant reference file. Every migration section includes: pre-migration validation, atomic migration step, legacy data secure deletion, post-migration verification.
-
Run the domain-specific checklist from the reference file after migration completes.
-
Verify no regressions using guidance from
testing-security-code.md.
Branch 3 — IMPLEMENT (Build from Scratch)
Goal: Build new keychain/security functionality correctly from the start.
Procedure:
- Identify which domain(s) the task touches. Use the Domain Selection Guide below.
- Load the relevant reference file(s). Follow ✅ code patterns — never deviate from them for the core security logic.
- Apply Core Guidelines (below) to every implementation.
- Run the domain-specific checklist before considering the implementation complete.
- Add tests following
testing-security-code.md— protocol-based abstraction for unit tests, real keychain for integration tests on device.
Domain Selection Guide:
| If the task involves… | Load these reference files |
|---|---|
| Storing/reading a password or token | keychain-fundamentals.md + credential-storage-patterns.md |
Choosing which kSecClass to use |
keychain-item-classes.md |
| Setting when items are accessible | keychain-access-control.md |
| Face ID / Touch ID gating | biometric-authentication.md + keychain-access-control.md |
| Hardware-backed keys | secure-enclave.md |
| Encrypting / hashing data | cryptokit-symmetric.md |
| Signing / key exchange / HPKE | cryptokit-public-key.md |
| OAuth tokens / API keys / logout | credential-storage-patterns.md |
| Sharing between app and extension | keychain-sharing.md |
| TLS pinning / client certificates | certificate-trust.md |
| Replacing UserDefaults / plist secrets | migration-legacy-stores.md |
| Writing tests for security code | testing-security-code.md |
| Enterprise audit / OWASP compliance | compliance-owasp-mapping.md |
Core Guidelines
These seven rules are non-negotiable. Every keychain/security implementation must satisfy all of them.
1. Never ignore OSStatus. Every SecItem* call returns an OSStatus. Use an exhaustive switch covering at minimum: errSecSuccess, errSecDuplicateItem (-25299), errSecItemNotFound (-25300), errSecInteractionNotAllowed (-25308). Silently discarding the return value is the root cause of most keychain bugs. → keychain-fundamentals.md
2. Never use LAContext.evaluatePolicy() as a standalone auth gate. This returns a Bool that is trivially patchable at runtime via Frida. Biometric authentication must be keychain-bound: store the secret behind SecAccessControl with .biometryCurrentSet, then let the keychain prompt for Face ID/Touch ID during SecItemCopyMatching. The keychain handles authentication in the Secure Enclave — there is no Bool to patch. → biometric-authentication.md
3. Never store secrets in UserDefaults, Info.plist, .xcconfig, or NSCoding archives. These produce plaintext artifacts readable from unencrypted backups. The Keychain is the only Apple-sanctioned store for credentials. → credential-storage-patterns.md, common-anti-patterns.md
4. Never call SecItem* on @MainActor. Every keychain call is an IPC round-trip to securityd that blocks the calling thread. Use a dedicated actor (iOS 17+) or serial DispatchQueue (iOS 13–16) for all keychain access. → keychain-fundamentals.md
5. Always set kSecAttrAccessible explicitly. The system default (kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked) breaks all background operations and may not match your threat model. Choose the most restrictive class that satisfies your access pattern. For background tasks: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly. For highest sensitivity: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly. → keychain-access-control.md
6. Always use the add-or-update pattern. SecItemAdd followed by SecItemUpdate on errSecDuplicateItem. Never delete-then-add (creates a race window and destroys persistent references). Never call SecItemAdd without handling the duplicate case. → keychain-fundamentals.md
7. Always target the data protection keychain on macOS. Set kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain: true for every SecItem* call on macOS targets. Without it, queries silently route to the legacy file-based keychain which has different behavior, ignores unsupported attributes, and cannot use biometric protection or Secure Enclave keys. Mac Catalyst and iOS-on-Mac do this automatically. → keychain-fundamentals.md
Quick Reference Tables
Accessibility Constants — Selection Guide
| Constant | When Decryptable | Survives Backup | Survives Device Migration | Background Safe | Use When |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
WhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly |
Unlocked + passcode set | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | Highest-security secrets; removed if passcode removed |
WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly |
Unlocked | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | Device-bound secrets not needed in background |
WhenUnlocked |
Unlocked | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | Syncable secrets (system default — avoid implicit use) |
AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly |
After first unlock → restart | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | Background tasks, push handlers, device-bound |
AfterFirstUnlock |
After first unlock → restart | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Background tasks that must survive restore |
Deprecated (never use): kSecAttrAccessibleAlways, kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly — deprecated iOS 12.
Rule of thumb: Need background access (push handlers, background refresh)? Start with AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly. Foreground-only? Start with WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. Tighten to WhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly for high-value secrets. Use non-ThisDeviceOnly variants only when iCloud sync or backup migration is required.
CryptoKit Algorithm Selection
| Need | Algorithm | Min iOS | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hash data | SHA256 / SHA384 / SHA512 |
13 | SHA3_256/SHA3_512 available iOS 18+ |
| Authenticate data (MAC) | HMAC<SHA256> |
13 | Always verify with constant-time comparison (built-in) |
| Encrypt data (authenticated) | AES.GCM |
13 | 256-bit key, 96-bit nonce, 128-bit tag. Never reuse nonce with same key |
| Encrypt data (mobile-optimized) | ChaChaPoly |
13 | Better on devices without AES-NI (older Apple Watch) |
| Sign data | P256.Signing / Curve25519.Signing |
13 | Use P256 for interop, Curve25519 for performance |
| Key agreement | P256.KeyAgreement / Curve25519.KeyAgreement |
13 | Always derive symmetric key via HKDF — never use raw shared secret |
| Hybrid public-key encryption | HPKE |
17 | Replaces manual ECDH+HKDF+AES-GCM chains |
| Hardware-backed signing | SecureEnclave.P256.Signing |
13 | P256 only; key never leaves hardware |
| Post-quantum key exchange | MLKEM768 |
26 | Formal verification (ML-KEM FIPS 203) |
| Post-quantum signing | MLDSA65 |
26 | Formal verification (ML-DSA FIPS 204) |
| Password → key derivation | PBKDF2 (via CommonCrypto) |
13 | ≥600,000 iterations SHA-256 (OWASP 2024) |
| Key → key derivation | HKDF<SHA256> |
13 | Extract-then-expand; always use info parameter for domain separation |
Anti-Pattern Detection — Quick Scan
When reviewing code, search for these patterns. Any match is a finding.
❌ = insecure pattern signature to detect in user code. ✅ = apply the corrective pattern in the referenced file.
| Search For | Anti-Pattern | Severity | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
UserDefaults.standard.set + token/key/secret/password |
Plaintext credential storage | CRITICAL | common-anti-patterns.md #1 |
| Hardcoded base64/hex strings (≥16 chars) in source | Hardcoded cryptographic key | CRITICAL | common-anti-patterns.md #2 |
evaluatePolicy without SecItemCopyMatching nearby |
LAContext-only biometric gate | CRITICAL | common-anti-patterns.md #3 |
SecItemAdd without checking return / OSStatus |
Ignored error code | HIGH | common-anti-patterns.md #4 |
No kSecAttrAccessible in add dictionary |
Implicit accessibility class | HIGH | common-anti-patterns.md #5 |
AES.GCM.Nonce() inside a loop with same key |
Potential nonce reuse | CRITICAL | common-anti-patterns.md #6 |
sharedSecret.withUnsafeBytes without HKDF |
Raw shared secret as key | HIGH | common-anti-patterns.md #7 |
kSecAttrAccessibleAlways |
Deprecated accessibility | HIGH | keychain-access-control.md |
SecureEnclave.isAvailable without #if !targetEnvironment(simulator) |
Simulator false-negative trap | MEDIUM | secure-enclave.md |
kSecAttrSynchronizable: true + ThisDeviceOnly |
Contradictory constraints | MEDIUM | keychain-item-classes.md |
SecTrustEvaluate (sync, deprecated) |
Legacy trust evaluation | MEDIUM | certificate-trust.md |
kSecClassGenericPassword + kSecAttrServer |
Wrong class for web credentials | MEDIUM | keychain-item-classes.md |
Top-Level Review Checklist
Use this checklist for a rapid sweep across all 14 domains. Each item maps to one or more reference files for deep-dive investigation. For domain-specific deep checks, use the Summary Checklist at the bottom of each reference file.
-
1. Secrets are in Keychain, not UserDefaults/plist/source — No credentials, tokens, or cryptographic keys in
UserDefaults,Info.plist,.xcconfig, hardcoded strings, orNSCodingarchives. OWASP M9 (Insecure Data Storage) directly violated. →common-anti-patterns.md#1–2,credential-storage-patterns.md,migration-legacy-stores.md,compliance-owasp-mapping.md -
2. Every
OSStatusis checked — AllSecItem*calls handle return codes with exhaustiveswitchor equivalent. No ignored returns.errSecInteractionNotAllowedis handled non-destructively (retry later, never delete). →keychain-fundamentals.md,common-anti-patterns.md#4 -
3. Biometric auth is keychain-bound — If biometrics are used, authentication is enforced via
SecAccessControl+ keychain access, notLAContext.evaluatePolicy()alone. →biometric-authentication.md,common-anti-patterns.md#3 -
4. Accessibility classes are explicit and correct — Every keychain item has an explicit
kSecAttrAccessiblevalue matching its access pattern (background vs foreground, device-bound vs syncable). No deprecatedAlwaysconstants. →keychain-access-control.md -
5. No
SecItem*calls on@MainActor— All keychain operations run on a dedicatedactoror background queue. No synchronous keychain access in UI code,viewDidLoad, orapplication(_:didFinishLaunchingWithOptions:). →keychain-fundamentals.md -
6. Correct
kSecClassfor each item type — Web credentials useInternetPassword(not GenericPassword) for AutoFill. Cryptographic keys usekSecClassKeywith properkSecAttrKeyType. App secrets useGenericPasswordwithkSecAttrService+kSecAttrAccount. →keychain-item-classes.md -
7. CryptoKit used correctly — Nonces never reused with the same key. ECDH shared secrets always derived through
HKDFbefore use as symmetric keys.SymmetricKeymaterial stored in Keychain, not in memory or files. Crypto operations covered by protocol-based unit tests. →cryptokit-symmetric.md,cryptokit-public-key.md,testing-security-code.md -
8. Secure Enclave constraints respected — SE keys are P256 only (classical), never imported (always generated on-device), device-bound (no backup/sync). Availability checks guard against simulator and keychain-access-groups entitlement issues. →
secure-enclave.md -
9. Sharing and access groups configured correctly —
kSecAttrAccessGroupuses fullTEAMID.group.identifierformat. Entitlements match between app and extensions. No accidental cross-app data exposure. →keychain-sharing.md -
10. Certificate trust evaluation is current — Uses
SecTrustEvaluateAsyncWithError(not deprecated synchronousSecTrustEvaluate). Pinning strategy uses SPKI hash orNSPinnedDomains(not leaf certificate pinning which breaks on annual rotation). →certificate-trust.md -
11. macOS targets data protection keychain — All macOS
SecItem*calls includekSecUseDataProtectionKeychain: true(except Mac Catalyst / iOS-on-Mac where it's automatic). →keychain-fundamentals.md
References Index
| # | File | One-Line Description | Risk |
|---|